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Abstract 
 
This article analyzes hospital privatization by comparing costs 
and quality between different ownership forms. We put the 
attention on the distinction between public hospitals and 
private hospitals with public funding. Using information about 
Spanish hospitals, we have found that private hospitals 
provide services at a lower cost at expenses of lower quality. 
We observe that property rights theory is fulfilled at least for 
the Spanish hospital market. The way that Heath Authorities 
finance publicly funded hospitals may be responsible for the 
differences in incentives between public and private centers. 
We argue that the trade-off between costs and quality could 
be minimized by designing financing contracts with fixed and 
variable components. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Public health expenditure has increased notably in recent decades. 
Technological change, the ageing of the population, the increase in public health 
coverage and the presence of more chronic diseases are the main factors explaining 
this phenomenon.  Since per capita expenditure for healthcare grew at an annual rate 
of 6%1 on average in OECD countries between 1990 and 2007, debates about 
healthcare systems arose in the nineties and have resulted in reforms in most OECD 
countries.   
In Europe, where the majority of healthcare systems are publicly funded, reforms 
were designed to pursue two objectives: cost-containment and the introduction of 
internal market competition. In order to achieve these goals health authorities 
delegated some of their responsibilities to the private sector2. As a result of these 
reforms healthcare markets are characterized by the simultaneous existence of public 
and private providers. Here we focus on the comparison of public hospitals and private 
hospitals with public funding, using data from Spanish hospitals from 1997 and 2007. 
Privatization may lead to cost savings if it introduces competition or if private 
firms can take better advantage of the economies of scale and scope than their public 
counterparts. However, in healthcare delivery, at least in publicly funded healthcare 
systems, such factors are not applicable. Indeed, it is difficult to introduce competition 
in the hospital market, as hospitals are isolated entities. Thus, the cost differences 
between ownership forms should be found in the managers’ incentives.  
Taking this into consideration, we claim that the mechanism used by Health 
Administrations to pay hospitals is a key element in hospital healthcare provision. If 
hospitals are paid a fixed amount per attributed patient or activity, which means that 
they are paid following a capitalization system, then managers would have an incentive 
to incur cost reductions to maximize their benefits. If health administrations reimburse 
all hospital expenses then managers would not have any motivation to reduce costs. 
The fact that healthcare delivery is a complex product implies that health 
administrations enter into incomplete contracts when they choose a private firm to 
provide healthcare services. In particular, healthcare delivery is characterized by 
having high transaction costs. This means that the contractor may find it difficult to 

1 Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Databases. 
2 Italy, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Germany and Spain are some examples of countries that 
applied such reforms during the nineties. 
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monitor hospital quality. According to Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), private hospitals 
may reduce costs at the expense of quality because it is difficult for health 
administrations to notice this reduction in quality. Overall, it is possible that a tradeoff 
between cost and quality reduction could arise from hospital privatization. 
In this paper, we undertake an empirical analysis to examine whether hospital 
privatization in Spain has led to cost savings at the expense of quality. This may 
provide an explicit test of the property rights theory in publicly funded healthcare 
systems. Note that another contribution of our paper is that we construct an index that 
takes into account several dimensions of hospital quality.  
We chose the Spanish hospital sector to carry out our analysis for several 
reasons. First, the healthcare reforms in Spain have been ambitious. These reforms 
were aimed at increasing the efficiency and reducing the cost of healthcare services by 
introducing private firms into the market. Second, as a result of these reforms there is a 
large variety of forms of healthcare delivery in the Spanish hospital market. Finally, the 
Spanish healthcare system is a National Health System with a publicly funded 
universal coverage. This allowed us to analyze both private and public firms providing a 
public service with public funds. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews both the theoretical and 
empirical literature about ownership and performance focusing on the hospital market. 
Section 3 deals with the data while giving an overview of the scope of privatization in 
the Spanish hospital market. Section 4 explains the empirical strategy. Section 5 gives 
the conclusions. 
II. THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL REVIEW OF HOSPITAL OWNERSHIP 
AND PERFORMANCE 
In this section we review economic theories related to privatization, ownership 
and performance in the hospital market. Then we give an overview of the empirical 
literature about ownership and performance in hospitals. 
2.1. Theories about ownership and performance 
With regard to market structure, two different economic theories agree on the 
idea that if privatization results in an increase in market competition then cost savings 
will be incurred. According to the Structure-Conduct-Performance (S-C-P) paradigm 
(Bain, 1951; Mason, 1939), industrial organization theories state that if privatization 
results in an improvement in market competition, then firms will modify their behavior, 
leading to more competitive results.  
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Theories explaining the positive relationship between competition and cost 
reduction can also be found in the Political Economy literature. Public choice believes 
that public agents are not benevolent, and thus they act in their own interests, as do 
private agents in private markets (Stigler, 1971). Thus for example, politicians want to 
be re-elected, so their conduct will be focused on vote maximization, which normally 
will lead to an overprovision of public services. Bureaucrats, meanwhile, are interested 
in maximizing their budgets, but once again this will result in overspending on public 
services (Brennan and Buchanan, 1980). Public choice theories claim that if 
competition in the provision of the service is introduced, then public agents will not 
have enough power to achieve their own objectives.   
With regard to hospital sector it is worth noting that introducing competition is a 
difficult task, at least for publicly funded healthcare systems. This phenomenon can be 
explained by the fact that it is the governmental health authority that normally plans 
healthcare services. In publicly funded systems patients are distributed among centers 
according to their demo-geographical location. For this reason, there is almost no 
opportunity for publicly funded centers to compete for patients. 
Privatization may also lead to costs savings if private firms can take better 
advantage of economies of scale and scope than their public counterparts. However, 
hospitals are isolated productive unities, and private firms do not have better 
opportunities than public entities to exploit economies of scale. In addition, private 
hospitals are normally smaller than public hospitals, at least in our context. It has to be 
noted that private hospitals normally offer a lower variety of healthcare services, so 
taking advantage of the economies of scope is also unlikely in the private healthcare 
sector. 
When studying healthcare delivery it is important to keep in mind that we are 
dealing with a particular sector. Medical care is characterized as being a complex 
market that violates most of the requisites of perfect competition. Arrow (1963) claimed 
the predominance of uncertainty in both healthcare demand and treatment 
effectiveness, which means that hospitals find it difficult to predict their costs.  
Moreover, the presence of asymmetric information gives the practitioner a key role in 
the market, so their incentives would determine market results. In addition, healthcare 
can be defined as a credence good, which means that the consumer is often not well 
informed about the quality of the service provided and cannot experience the quality of 
the good. In summary, as healthcare is a complex product, contracting out public 
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healthcare services is associated with high transaction costs. Taking all market 
imperfections into account, the incentives for different healthcare organizations are a 
key determinant of healthcare market results.  
In this context, the relationship between hospitals and Health Authorities is a key 
element determining market results. Transaction costs theories can help us to develop 
different hypotheses about the effect of privatization on the hospital sector.   
Transaction costs theories focus on the effect of costs in service delivery 
including administrative costs and the costs of incomplete contracts. This theory states 
that factors such as asset specificity, uncertainty (Brown and Potosky, 2003) or 
monitoring and control (Sappinton and Stiglitz, 1987) determine the potential problems 
and risks of contracting public services, because these features increase the 
complexity of the contracts for public service delivery. Following Hart and Moore (2008) 
and Williamson (1975), complex contracts could lead to undesirable contractor 
behavior because it is difficult to monitor their acts.  
In relation to healthcare, we have seen that it is a complex product in which 
uncertainty, asymmetric information and non-contractible quality have an important 
role. In addition, hospitals require assets that can only be used for healthcare. These 
are precisely the elements that are difficult to control during the fulfillment of the 
contract, and increase the complexity of the contracts for healthcare delivery, which 
could lead to unprofessional practitioner behavior that goes undetected by public 
agencies.   
Based on the idea that different organizational forms have distinct objectives, the 
property rights theory analyzes the economic incentives of public and private firms by 
studying who has the residual control rights of non-human assets. Hart, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) claimed that private firms have strong incentives to invest in innovations 
because they have well defined control rights, but as they would gain more benefit from 
cost reduction, private providers may over-invest in cost-cutting at the expense of 
quality. The authors assumed the presence of asymmetric information, and the idea 
behind their findings is based on the fact that private deliverers ignore the adverse 
effects of non-contractible quality. 
Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) discussed the implications of their theory for 
healthcare delivery. They argued that in this sector both the gains for innovation and 
the harm of quality reduction are potentially enormous and that consumers do not 
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notice a reduction in quality. For these reasons, they predicted that public property 
would be superior to private in the healthcare sector. 
To sum up, economic theories of ownership and behavior predict that public 
hospitals would be more costly than their public counterparts and private firms would 
provide lower quality services than public hospitals. As it is difficult to introduce 
competition in the hospital market, and the economies of scale and scope are more 
prone to arise in public hospitals, the reduction in hospital costs as a result of 
privatization may be explained by differences in incentive between ownership forms. 
Taking into account the fact that healthcare delivery is characterized as being a 
complex product, which means that it is difficult for Health Authorities to monitor the 
quality offered, private hospitals may be taking advantage of the transaction costs by 
reducing costs at the expense of quality.  
2.2. Empirical literature about hospital privatization 
The empirical literature analyzing the effects of privatization on market 
performance finds no clear evidence about the expected consequences of privatization. 
In their review of empirical studies on the effects of selling public firms, Megginson and 
Netter (2001) concluded that privatization leads to cost savings, while Bel, Fageda and 
Warner (2010) found no systematic relationship between ownership and costs in their 
meta-analysis study about contracting out local services.  
Conflicting results are also found when studying the impact of hospital 
privatization on performance3. Table 1, which summarizes the empirical studies about 
hospital privatization, shows the variety of results found in the literature. 
The vast majority of empirical literature analyzing the effect of hospital 
privatization does it by relating hospital ownership and costs. As can be seen in Table 
1, there is no systematic relationship between hospital ownership and costs.  
It is worth noting that the majority of studies analyzing the US hospital market 
found that private for-profit hospitals were more costly than non-profit and public 
entities (Granneman et al., 1986; Ozcan et al., 1992). However, most of the analyses 
carried out for European countries showed the opposite (Barbetta et al., 2007; López-
Casasnovas and Wagstaff, 1997). Note that while in Europe the majority of private 

3 See Malani et al. (2003) and Sloan (2000) for a theoretical and empirical review of hospital 
ownership and performance. 
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hospitals receive public funds, in US private hospitals are basically financed by their 
consumers. 
The empirical relationship between ownership behavior and hospital quality has 
been less well analyzed. It is worth noting that almost all studies concern the US 
hospital market. The relationship between hospital ownership and quality is not clear 
either. Although some studies found private hospitals to offer a lower quality of services 
(Mark, 1996), the opposite is also true (Keeler et al., 1992). As Table 1 shows, the 
results differ depending on the definition of quality used and the sample included in the 
analysis. 
To our knowledge all studies analyzing hospital quality have used partial 
indicators for rating hospitals. We believe that it is convenient to construct an index that 
combines all quality dimensions that can be found in a hospital. In this way it would be 
possible to compare public and private for-profit and non-profit hospitals from a broader 
perspective.  
Very few studies have examined hospital costs and quality at the same time and 
those that have did so by comparing the costs and quality of treating specific diseases. 
As far as we know, three studies have undertaken this kind of analysis. Herzlinger and 
Krasker (1987) found no differences in the costs and quality between US public, private 
for-profit and non-profit hospitals. Sloan et al. (2001) found US for-profit hospitals to be 
more expensive, but they found differences in quality offered. Finally, Lien et al. (2008), 
who studied the Taiwanese hospital market, claimed that there were no differences in 
medical expenditure between ownership forms, but they detected differences in quality. 
In particular, non-profit firms offered a higher quality than their for-profit counterparts. 
III.  DATA FROM THE SPANISH HOSPITAL SECTOR 
The data used in this study were extracted from the Estadística de 
Establecimientos Sanitarios con Régimen de Internado  (EESRI), a survey that is 
carried out annually by the Spanish Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, for the years 
1997 and 2007. All Spanish hospitals and their dependent centers are obliged to 
provide the information requested in the survey.  
The EESRI provides census information about hospital resources, healthcare and 
economic activity as well as who is paying each patient’s costs. Note that this survey is 
protected by the Statistical Secrecy Law 12/1989, which protects all kinds of personal 
data. For this reason, we were unable to determine the precise location of each 
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hospital in our database. In particular we only had information about the region in which 
each hospital was found.  
The EESRI provided information about 789 hospitals for 1997 and 764 for 2007, 
which represents 88.15% and 83.4% of the centers registered in the hospital census4. 
Of these hospitals we had to eliminate 18 observations because the data they provided 
was confusing. We worked with a sample of 1535 observations, 783 from 1997 and 
752 from 2007. 
As we were working with economic data from different years we deflated all 
monetary variables in order to convert all data to constant 2007 prices. We used the 
Consumer Price Inflation provided by the Spanish National Statistics. 
To construct the quality index we used data from the Barómetro Sanitario, a 
statistical report produced annually by the Spanish Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs.  
Healthcare delivery in Spain is carried out by three types of center: public 
hospitals in which the Public Administration directly provides healthcare services, 
private centers that are publicly funded and private entities in which the users pay for 
the services received. 
The mechanism of finance of each kind of managerial form remains a key 
element to understand the different incentives of the agents. Public hospitals are 
financed by a global budget, which theoretically is based on prospective payments. 
This means that hospitals agree on an ex-ante budget with the Health Authorities. 
When the agreed budget is not sufficient to cover public hospitals costs, an extra 
budgetary subsidy is transferred to finance the hospital costs (López-Casasnovas, 
2001). For this reason, it can be said that the expenses of public Spanish hospitals are 
guaranteed to be covered. 
On the other hand, the relationship between the Public Administration and 
private providers is defined by a contract. Resources are allocated to service providers 
in one single package, as in a capitation formula, and private managers decide how to 
use these resources. This means that private hospitals that deliver public healthcare 
services have a fixed budget with which to carry out their activities.  

4 In Spain hospitals are registered in the Catálogo Nacional de Hospitales (CNH). In 1997, 895 
hospitals were registered in the CNH while in 2007 there were 916. 
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The diversity of healthcare management in the different regions explains the 
heterogeneity of hospital ownership that can be found in Spain. In particular, 39.29%  
and 40.69% of Spanish hospitals were publicly managed in 2007  and 1997 
respectively, 45.11%  and 42.36% were run by private for-profit entities respectively, 
and 16.94% and 16.94% by private non-profit firms.  As Figure 1 shows, the 
importance of being private for profit and non-profit hospitals varies between regions.  
The proportion of private for-profit installed beds increased from 18.21% in 1997 
to 21.61% ten years later. On the other hand, public and private non-for-profit beds 
decreased from 67.83% to 65.93% and from 13.29% to 12.46% respectively. The 
proportion of private beds also varies between regions.  
From Figure 1 it is worth noting that the proportion of private hospitals is higher 
than the proportion of private beds. This reflects the fact that at least for the Spanish 
hospital sector, private hospitals are smaller than their public counterparts. 
It is interesting to examine the scope of public funds in private hospitals in order 
to gain an overview of the importance of the private sector in the Spanish National 
Health System, and as a consequence in terms of public expenditure. In particular, 
almost 50% of private hospitals finance more than half of their patients with public 
funds. The scope for public funds in private hospitals is higher in non-profit centers.  
Public hospitals are on average more costly than their private counterparts. At 
first glance this could be explained in several ways. First, public hospitals are, on 
average, bigger than private centers. Second, public entities receive, on average, more 
complex patients than private for-profit hospitals. And finally, the quality offered by 
public centers is, on average, higher than that offered by their private counterparts5. 
IV.  EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
Our empirical strategy relies on estimating cost and quality equations including 
ownership as an explanatory variable in order to test whether the property rights theory 
is fulfilled in the Spanish hospital market. In this section we describe the variables used 
in our empirical model and we present the main results. 
4.1. Description of the variables 
While it is easy to define and control for hospital inputs, outputs are not easy to 
characterize. Hospitals produce a wide range of heterogeneous services, so defining 

5 Using a Student’s t-test for mean differences we found them to be statistically significant.  
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hospital production is a complex task (Pinto et al., 2008). For that reason hospital cost 
studies have used intermediate outputs as a measure of hospital activity. Table 2 
describes and summarizes the variables used in the analysis.  
Dependent variables: total deflated hospital costs and quality index 
For the cost equation we used the total deflated unitary expenditure as a 
dependent variable. This reflects the total disbursement made by the hospital in assets 
or services required for developing its activity, the most outstanding being labor 
expenditure, pharmaceutical and material goods. With the objective of having a 
comparable measure of hospital costs we deflated 1997 total expenditure into 2007 
prices and obtained unitary costs by dividing the total deflated expenditure by the 
number of discharged patients. 
Health outcomes depend on the quality of care received, which means that the 
higher the quality of a hospital, the better its outcomes will be. Some forms of hospital 
quality may easily be observed by patients, such as food or the size of the room, but 
other forms are more difficult for patients to gauge, for example, the quality of the 
personnel (Sloan et al., 2001). One of the main difficulties for the analysis arises in 
establishing a satisfactory operational definition of quality. Following Vuori (1988) we 
constructed a quality index that takes into account different dimensions of quality and 
provides an acceptable overview of each hospital standard.  
Many studies have analyzed the effect of ownership on hospital quality6 but as 
mentioned above all of them have used partial quality variables such as mortality rates 
or other adverse rates such as complications or medical errors. This limits hospital 
quality analysis to just one variable, which may not reflect real hospital quality. 
On the basis that hospital quality is not a one-dimensional attribute, Vuori (1988) 
defined quality in healthcare services as a combination of three different outcomes: 
adaptability, scientific/technical quality and degree of consumer and professional 
satisfaction. Adaptability means in terms of balancing the needs and expectations of 
the public, scientific/technical quality means that the services and techniques provided 
should be in accordance with the level of current scientific/technical knowledge, and 
consumer and professional satisfaction refers on one hand, to satisfying the needs and 
expectations of clients, and on the other hand the conditions and expectations of health 
personnel (Solà and Prior, 2001).   

6 See Eggleston et al. (2008) for a systematic review.  
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In order to obtain a more accurate relation between ownership and hospital 
quality we constructed a quality index that takes into account these three dimensions of 
hospital quality. As it was not obvious how to find variables that exactly measure each 
of the quality definitions listed above, we used proxies to represent them. Table 3 gives 
a summary of all variables included, their source and summary statistics.  
As proxies for adaptability we included the number of nurses per installed bed 
and the number of pieces of hospital equipment, such as incubators or surgical rooms, 
per installed bed. Although using physical labor or capital intensity as quality variables 
has its limitations, they have been used in recent empirical literature. Farsi and Filippini 
(2008), for example, used a hospital’s nurse per bed ratio to represent the quality of 
nursing care. 
In order to approximate scientific/technical quality we included the hospital 
mortality rate, the technological equipment such as X-ray or hemodynamic rooms per 
installed bed and a variable defining whether a hospital served as a medical school for 
graduates. In Spain not all hospitals are authorized to train graduates. To open training 
vacancies hospitals must fulfil certain requirements. For this reason, we assumed that 
the fact that a hospital has postgraduate positions may be a sign of hospital quality. 
Previous studies such as those of Aletras (1999) and Farsi and Filippini (2008) also 
used a variable representing hospital training as a proxy for hospital quality.  
To capture consumer satisfaction7 we included a variable representing a 
consumer satisfaction survey carried out by the Spanish Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs. In particular, we rated the second question of the survey in which citizens were 
asked about their overall opinion of the healthcare system.  
To construct our quality index we gave a point for each category that a hospital i
was above average during time t, except for the mortality rate which we consigned a 
point if the hospital mortality rate was below average, and for the medical school 
variable which took a value of one if the hospital had postgraduate students. Ultimately 
we obtained an ordinal variable that ranked hospital quality from 0 to 6, where 0 was 
the lowest possible hospital quality and 6 the highest.  
Ownership variables 

7 We were unable to include the degree of professional satisfaction because the sources 
available from the Spanish Ministry for Labor and Immigration do not provide concrete 
information for the healthcare sector. 
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In order to evaluate the effect of privatization on hospital costs and quality we 
included in our estimations two dummy variables, one representing private for-profit 
hospitals and the other representing private non-profit centers. In this way we took 
public hospitals as the reference type. 
We used the definition in the EESRI to classify hospitals into different ownership 
types. In particular, we considered as a public hospital all entities that are legally 
dependent on the Spanish National Public Health System. With regard to private non-
profit hospitals we included all organizations that do not distribute their surplus to 
owners or stakeholders, such as Church Hospitals or Foundations. Finally, we 
considered those centers that are managed by private firms to be private for-profit 
hospitals.  
Although the aim of our study was to analyze the provision of publicly financed 
healthcare services, we included a dummy variable to control for those private 
hospitals that are financed with private funds. We believe that such centers would not 
behave like private hospitals that depend on public funds. 
Hospital output variables
O’Neill et al. (2008) found that the empirical literature on hospital efficiency used 
a wide variety of hospital intermediate inputs. In our analysis we used the number of 
discharged patients8 as a measure of hospital activity, as suggested in several studies 
(Barbetta, 2007; Ozcan, 1992; O’Neill, 2008).  
One of the main features of the healthcare market is the uncertainty of both the 
demand for and the effectiveness of the treatments. For this reason a hospital may 
encounter a wide variety of cases that may be more or less complex depending on 
multiple unpredictable factors. To control for both the complexity and severity of illness 
we constructed a case-mix index, as defined by Roemer (1968) and used by Aletras 
(1999).  
The index adjusts a hospital’s average length of stay by its occupancy rate in 
order to exclude the influences of exogenous supply and demand, which also affect the 
length of stay (Aletras, 1999). The formula applied in our database is expressed in 
equation (1). 
 (1) 

8 A discharged patient is normally defined as a case who has previously been admitted into the 
hospital (Redrado, 2007). 
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 where  and  
and   is the average length of stay in hospital i during the period t,   
is the occupancy rate of hospital i during t, and , is the mean occupancy of all 
sample hospitals in t. This formula weights the average length of stay by the proportion 
with which a hospital’s occupancy rate differs from the mean occupancy of the sample 
in each period. 
We also included a rotation index that captures the marginal effect that an 
increase in hospital activity could have on hospital performance. We defined our index 
following Redrado (2007). See expression (2). 
 (2) 
Hospital input variables 
We included different variables in order to represent hospital inputs. As in the 
previously published hospital cost literature (Aletras, 1999; Sloan et al., 2001), we used 
the number of installed beds to represent hospital size as a proxy for capital assets. 
Hospital size is a particularly important control variable given the notable differences in 
input and output mixes that exist between large and small hospitals (Ozcan, 1992).  
It is important to note that about two-thirds of hospital costs are due to payroll 
expenses, so including labor inputs in a hospital cost equation is indispensable. We 
introduced the average wage, calculated from the total personal expenditure divided by 
the number of employees in the hospital. 
In line with Farsi and Filippinni (2008) we also included a dummy variable for the 
emergency room in order to capture those hospitals that are usually involved in severe 
cases.  
Finally, a variable reflecting hospital investment was also incorporated. We used 
the total deflated investment in fixed assets per discharged patient.  
Control variables 
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In order to control for unobserved differences between hospitals we included 
dummies for hospital type and time9.  
With regard to hospital type, we used the hospital classification used by the EESRI. 
This statistic classifies hospitals into five types: general, surgical, other acute, 
psychiatric and long term. We considered general hospitals as the reference case so 
we included four dummies to represent the other hospital types. 
As we were working with data from two different years, 1997 and 2007, we 
introduced a dummy variable for all 2007 observations. In this way we were able to 
capture the overall technological progress and the variation in unobserved variables 
such as potential differences in data collection from one year to another. 
4.2. The empirical model 
Determinants of hospital costs 
To estimate the effect of ownership on hospital costs we used a cost equation in its 
reduced form. The continuous variables are expressed in logarithms. The equation 
used is as follows: 
(3) 
where i represents each hospital and t the period of time analyzed. The 
explanatory variables are defined in the previous section and summarized in Table 2.  
As we saw in Section 2 economic theories about ownership and performance 
provide different explanations for the potential cost savings of privatization. Following 
the property rights theory, private hospitals may incur lower costs than their public 
counterparts, but this could be associated with the provision of lower quality healthcare 
services.  
On the contrary, we expect privately funded hospitals to behave differently from 
publicly supported centers. In particular, we believe that completely private entities 
should incur higher costs than public centers and may offer a higher quality of services. 

9 We estimated our cost and quality equations including regional dummies but this incurred 
multicollinearity problems without improving our results. For this reason, we decided not to 
include them in the analysis. 
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Note that in privately funded hospitals patients pay for the treatments received, so in 
order to capture clients, private hospitals might offer a higher quality of services that 
would lead to higher costs. 
The effect of discharged patients on hospital costs will depend on how the 
economies of scale affect the hospital cost structure. If, on average, Spanish hospitals 
benefit from economies of scale we could expect discharged patients to have a 
negative effect. This would mean that an increase in hospital activity reduces unitary 
costs, and thus having more patients would improve hospital efficiency. If, on the 
contrary, Spanish hospitals suffer diseconomies of scale, then additional fixed costs 
would have a greater impact than lower variable costs per patient, and thus an 
increase in activity would lead to a rise in unitary costs. For this reason we were unable 
to determine a priori the relation between discharged patients and unitary costs. 
In relation to the case-mix index we could expect to find a positive relationship 
with hospital unitary costs. The more complex the patients that the hospital receives, 
the more costly it would be to treat them. Furthermore, a previous report found a 
positive relationship between costs and the case-mix index (Aletras, 1999).  
As explained earlier, we also included a rotation index to capture the marginal 
effect of hospital activity on hospital costs. The relationship between the rotation index 
and our dependent variable is not certain and would depend on how discharged 
patients and the number of installed beds influence hospital costs. 
The empirical literature on hospital costs is clear about the effect of hospital 
capacity on costs. Among others, Aletras (1999) and Sloan et al. (2001) found that 
hospital capacity has a positive relationship with costs. The idea behind this result is 
that an increment in installed beds represents a rise in hospital fixed capital, which is 
related to an increase in hospital costs. For this reason we could expect a positive 
relationship between the number of installed beds and hospital unitary costs. 
Another variable that we would expect to have a positive relationship with unitary 
costs is the average salary. It is clear that an increase in personnel costs will lead to a 
rise in unitary costs.  
Based on the same idea as that for the case-mix variable, we could expect to find 
a positive relationship between unitary hospital costs and the emergency room 
variable. The availability of an emergency room attracts more severely ill patients into 
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the hospital, thus leading to higher costs. Previous studies, such as that by Farsi and 
Filippini (2008), have corroborated this idea. 
Regarding the investment in fixed assets we would expect it to have a positive 
relationship with unitary costs. Investment in fixed assets represents an increase in 
hospital fixed capital, thus we should find the same relationship as with the number of 
installed beds. In addition, any expenditure would yield a rise in unitary costs. 
Determinants of hospital quality 
To estimate the empirical effect of privatization on hospital quality we used a 
quality equation in its reduced form. The continuous variables are expressed in 
logarithms. The empirical expression used in the analysis can be seen in equation (4). 
 
where i represents each hospital and t the period of time analyzed. Note that all 
variables used in the cost equation were also used for regressing hospital quality. 
As mentioned above, the property rights theory predicts that private hospitals with 
public funding may have lower costs at the expense of lower quality. On the contrary, 
privately funded hospitals should provide healthcare services of a higher quality in 
order to capture more clients. 
The effect of discharged patients on quality is not clear. In fact all variables 
accounting for hospital activity could affect hospital quality in two different ways: the 
learning effect and congestion effect. The former would improve hospital quality while 
the latter would have the opposite effect. 
The fact that a hospital has a large number of discharged patients per year may 
improve hospital quality because of the learning effect. Hospital personnel would have 
more experience and thus could offer better services. In contrast, receiving many 
patients may reflect a situation of hospital congestion. If a hospital is congested quality 
may be eroded because patients would have to register on waiting lists and 
practitioners would have to treat more patients and the time per patient would thus 
decrease. Taking all this into consideration, it is not clear what effect the number of 
discharged patients would have on hospital quality. 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                 Document de Treball 2010/12  pàg. 19
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                   Working Paper         2010/12 pag. 19


The effect of the case-mix index on hospital quality is also ambiguous because 
receiving complex cases could be related to quality in different ways. Higher quality 
might result because complex cases require more sophisticated techniques and thus 
the hospital would display higher levels of scientific/technical quality, but lower quality 
might result because complex cases present more uncertainty and thus patients might 
have a lower probability of recovery. 
The effect of the rotation index would depend on the variables constructing the 
quality index. At the same time the controversy between learning and congestion is 
also applicable.   
The relationship between hospital size and quality is not simple either. On the 
one hand, a larger hospital could capture variations in healthcare demand to a better 
extent, and so it would present higher levels of adaptability. But holding other inputs 
constant, this could also mean offering a lower quality of attention to patients because 
it would mean attending more patients with the same personnel.  
The variable capturing personnel salaries is the only one in the quality analysis 
for which we could define a clear relationship with the dependent variable. In particular, 
we would expect to find a positive relation between salaries and quality because it is 
accepted worldwide that increasing salaries is an effective mechanism for improving 
service quality. 
Regarding the emergency room variable we were unable to predict a priori the 
results that we would find. On the one hand, having an emergency room could 
positively affect quality because such hospitals would show higher levels of adaptability 
and because they are normally equipped with high levels of technology, and thus would 
present high levels of scientific/technical quality. On the other hand, it could mean that 
resources are channeled through the emergency room such that the rest of the 
services have tighter budgets, which could be reflected in the provision of lower quality 
healthcare.   
In relation to investment in fixed assets we expected it to have a positive 
relationship with quality. The idea of introducing this variable was to capture the 
intention of a hospital to improve the quality of healthcare, such that the more a 
hospital invests, the higher quality it will provide. 
4.3. Estimation and results 
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We performed the regressions for the complete sample and just for general 
hospitals. In both cases we analyzed on one hand all centers and on the other hand 
only publicly funded hospitals. We considered publicly funded entities those hospitals 
that finance more than 90% of their patients with public funds. 
First, we performed the regressions for the complete sample; second, we 
analyzed only those entities that were financing more than 90% of their patients with 
public funds; then we studied general hospitals; and finally, we included only publicly 
funded general hospitals. 
Recall that we estimated hospital costs and quality equations in their reduced 
form so that each equation had the same explanatory variables. As our quality index is 
a censured variable we could not apply a Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equations 
(SURE) estimation. For these reasons, we estimated the cost and quality equations 
separately. 
Determinants of hospital costs 
We estimated equation (3) using the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) methodology 
for all cost estimations. Table 4 shows the results for each regression. The estimated 
coefficients are mostly significant and generally have the expected sign.  
Private for-profit and non-profit hospitals presented lower costs per discharged 
patient than their public counterparts. As Table 4 shows, the ownership variables are 
significant at 1% and have negative signs. Moreover, these results hold for all our 
regressions.  
We found that private for-profit hospitals with public funds expended, on average, 
3,111.5 € less per patient than public centers. In the same way, the unitary expenditure 
in private non-profit hospitals was, on average, 3,791.5 € less than in their public 
counterparts. We should be careful when analyzing these results because the estimate 
coefficients are never totally precise. In our case, we may have captured differences 
between case severity within ownership types. The differences were smaller when the 
estimation focused on general hospitals. In particular, private for-profit (non-profit) 
general hospitals spent 1,327.7 € (1,459.1 €) less per patient than public entities.  So, 
when comparing hospitals of the same type the cost differences between public and 
private hospitals were not as large.  
The opposite was found for privately funded hospitals. From our estimates we 
can state that privately funded hospitals are more costly than their public counterparts. 
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In particular, privately funded hospitals spent, on average, 824.2 € more per patient 
than publicly funded centers. These differences were also reduced when focusing on 
general hospitals. Specifically, privately funded general hospitals cost 452.2 € more per 
patient than public centers. These results are consistent with studies from the US. 
The effect of Ln_discharged on hospital costs was negative and significant at 1%. 
We found that this relationship was maintained for all estimates. Based on our results 
we can say that, on average, Spanish hospitals enjoy economies of scale. Publicly 
funded hospitals enjoy the largest benefits with a 7.5% reduction for each 10% rise in 
the number of discharged patients. 
The Ln_Rotation Index had a negative effect on per patient costs. This variable 
was just significant at 1% for general hospitals. These results may be explained by the 
fact that different hospital types were being considered in the other estimates. As 
different hospitals might be experiencing different cost responses to hospital activity, 
the average effect is unclear. 
As expected, hospital inputs affected unitary expenditure positively. 
Ln_installed_beds,  Ln_average_wage and Ln_investment were statistically significant 
at 1% in all estimates.  The same results were found for the variable accounting for 
whether the hospital has an emergency room, but were just significant at 5% when we 
used the whole sample and not significant when including just general hospitals. 
In relation to the case-mix variable we had expected to find a positive relationship 
with hospital unitary expenditure, but we only found a significant relationship when 
including the whole sample. In our opinion, it is possible that the case-mix index that 
we constructed does not properly reflect the patients’ complexity and severity of illness. 
We believe that information about the exact diagnoses treated in each hospital would 
provide better information with which to construct a case-mix index than a weighted 
average length of stay.     
Determinants of hospital quality 
As explained above, we constructed a quality index in order to capture different 
dimensions of hospital quality. Our quality index used ranks from 0 to 6, and thus we 
estimated our equation (4) using an Ordered Logistic regression. Table 5 shows the 
results for each regression. 
Our estimates indicate that private for-profit and non-profit hospitals provide a 
lower quality of services than their public counterparts. Table 5 shows that both 
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ownership variables were negative and significant at 1%. These results are robust 
because they hold for the four estimates. In the light of our results it can be stated that 
the property rights theory holds for the Spanish hospital sector. Accordingly, we can 
say that private hospitals are less costly than public centers because private managers 
tend to reduce the quality of the services provided. 
We also found that the variable for privately funded hospitals was positive but not 
statistically significant. Although privately funded hospitals try to attract patients by 
offering more expensive services, it is not clear that the quality offered is higher than in 
public centers. 
Our estimates suggest that learning effects predominate in the Spanish hospital 
market. We found Ln_discharged to be positive and significant at 1% for all our 
estimates. In contrast, the congestion effect appeared when analyzing hospital capacity 
and rotation. In particular, Ln_installed_beds was negative and statistically significant 
at 1% in all estimates and Ln_Rotation-Index was negative and significant for all 
estimates except for publicly funded hospitals.  
Hospital quality increases when the investment in fixed assets increases 
(Ln_Investment) and when there is an emergency room (Emergency_room). Ln_Case-
mix and the average salary did not have any impact on hospital quality. It should be 
noted that in the majority of hospitals all personnel have regulated salaries, so hospital 
managers cannot use salaries as an incentive. It is preferable to think that they use 
non-monetary elements, like flexibility or fewer medical guards, as an incentive 
mechanism. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Healthcare is a complex market with high transaction costs. Furthermore, the 
effect of privatization on cost reduction cannot be explained by the introduction of 
competition and/or by the fact that private firms take better advantage of economies of 
scale and scope. According to property rights theories the explanation of cost 
differences between ownership forms should be found in managers’ incentives. In 
particular, private firms are more prone to engage in cost reductions at the expense of 
quality. 
Our empirical analysis showed that private for-profit and non-profit hospitals incur 
lower per patient expenditure than their public counterparts. Moreover, we can confirm 
that those differences are partially explained by the fact that private hospitals provide a 
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lower quality of service. The way that Heath Authorities finance publicly funded 
hospitals may be responsible for the differences in incentives between public and 
private centers. Private hospitals are normally paid by a capitation system, so their 
managers would have incentives to engage in cost reduction at the expense of quality 
in order to maximize hospital profits. Public centers, on the other hand, do not have 
such economic restrictions, so the incentive for reducing costs would be less strong. 
Overall, we can say that property rights theory is fulfilled at least in the Spanish hospital 
market.  
When analyzing private hospitals offering private healthcare services the results 
are different. We found that privately funded centers do not offer services at lower 
costs although the quality offered is no higher than in public centers. The idea behind 
this is that privately funded hospitals need to appear to provide better services in order 
to attract new clients. 
Finally, we were lacking information about the institutional differences between 
hospitals. It is worth noting that each entity has a special relationship with the Health 
Administration, so knowing the individual type of contractual relationship would be very 
useful for determining which features provide incentives to private firms to cut costs at 
the expense of quality. 
Considering the results found, it is worth noting that Health Authorities face a 
trade-off between costs and quality when choosing private hospitals as providers of 
public healthcare services. Under a context of fiscal restrictions privatization could be a 
reasonable solution because it could represent a notable reduction in public 
expenditure by guaranteeing a minimum of quality. However, if the current Government 
gives priority to Health Policies and to quality of health services, then privatization 
could not be an appropriate solution, because private hospitals with public funding may 
provide health services at lower quality that public entities. 
This trade-off could be minimized by designing contracts and finance 
mechanisms that redirect private incentives. As far as we are concerned, if Health 
Authorities finance private entities through a prospective basis, it would lead to hospital 
managers to over expend in the provision of their services. This would end into an 
increasing of public expenditure. On the other hand, if private centers are financed by a 
capitation mechanism, which means that hospitals receive a fix amount per patient 
attended, managers would be tended to reduce unitary costs in order to increase their 
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benefits. Following our results this cost reduction would be accompanied by a decrease 
of the quality offered.  
We believe that a financing contract that includes fixed and variable payments 
could minimize the trade off. Keeping a fixed part the Health Authority can ensure that 
the hospital receive a minimum of income and that have incentives to save costs. In 
addition, the introduction of a variable payment based on the severity of illnesses 
treated and a quality indicator could reinforce the maintenance of a minimum of quality. 
Hence, private hospitals could take into account the adverse effect that cost reduction 
has on hospital quality. The optimal combination of the fixed and variable parts in the 
financing contract of hospitals could be the subject of future research.  
Once again the need of a proper definition of hospital quality arises as a potential 
limitation in order to maximize the benefits of a mixed reimbursement method. We have 
presented a first draw of what we believe that a complete quality indicator would be, 
but further research should be done to find a better approach for constructing a quality 
index. 
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FIGURES AND TABLES 
Figure 1. Proportion of private hospitals and beds in the Spanish hospital market. 2007. 
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Table 1. Empirical Literature about Hospital Privatization, Costs and Quality 
Ownership 
forms 
included
Sample
Methodology 
Quality 
variable 
Results 
Hospital ownership and costs 
Becker & Sloan  
(1985) 
PUB, PFP, 
PNP 
USA. 1900 hospitals. 
1979. 
Cost 
Regression 
Inconsistent Results 
Granneman et 
al. (1986) 
PUB, PFP, 
PNP 
USA. 867 hospitals. Cost 
Regression 
PFP more costly than PNP 
and PUB 
Ozcan et al.  
(1992) 
PUB, PFP, 
PNP 
USA. 3000 hospitals. 1987 DEA PUB more efficient 
Herr 
(2008) 
PUB, PFP, 
PNP 
Germany 1556-1635 
hospitals. 2000-2003 
SF 
 
PUB more efficient 
Barbetta et al. 
(2007) 
PUB, PNP Italy. 531 hospitals.  
1995-2000 
DEA PNP more efficient  
Daidone and 
Amico (2009) 
PUB, PFP, 
PNP 
Italy. 625 hospitals. 2000-
2005 
SF PUB and PNP more efficient 
Farsi and 
Filippini 
(2008) 
PUB, PFP, 
PNP 
Switzerland. 150 
hospitals.  
1998-2003 
SF No differences 
Piror & Solà 
(1993) 
PUB, PFP Spain. Catalonia. 169 
hospitals. 1989 
DEA No differences 
López-
Casasnovas & 
Wagstaff 
(1997) 
PUB, PFP Spain. Catalonia. 43 
hospitals. 1988-1991 
DEA PFP more efficient 
Dalmau-
Matarrodona & 
Puig-Junoy 
(1998) 
PUB, PFP Spain. Catalonia. 94 
hospitals. 1990 
DEA No differences 
Hospital ownership and quality 
Keeler et al.  
(1992) 
PUB, PFP, 
PNP 
USA. 14.008 elderly 
patients. 297 hospitals. 
1981-1982 & 1985-1986 
Diagnosis and 
treatments. 
Doctor’s 
opinion. 
PUB offer lower quality. No 
differences between private 
types. 
Brennan, et al. 
(1991) 
PUB, PFP, 
PNP 
USA. New York. 31.000 
patients. 51 hospitals. 
1984 
Adverse Rates No differences 
Shortell & 
Hughes 
(1988) 
PFP, PNP USA. 214.839 patients. 
981 hospitals.  
1983-1984 
Mortality Rates No differences 
Mark  
(1996) 
PFP, PNP USA. 286 hospitals.  
1984-1989 
Third-party 
Assessment 
PFP lower quality 
Hospital ownership, costs and quality 
Herzlinger & 
Krasker 
(1987) 
PUB, PFP, 
PNP 
USA. 563 hospitals. 1982 Cost: Pair 
Comparison 
Quality: Third-
party 
Assessment 
No differences 
Sloan et al.  
(2001) 
PUB, PFP, 
PNP 
USA. 8.404 medical 
cases. 1982-1995 
Quality: 
Mortality Rates 
Logit 
Estimation 
PFP more costly.  
No quality differences.  
Lien et al. 
(2008) 
PFP, PNP Taiwan. 127.623-149.160 
cases. 480-515 hospitals. 
1997-2000 
OLS and IV 
Estimation 
No costs differences 
PNP higher quality 
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Note: Public (PUB) Private for-profit (PFP) and non-profit (PNP). Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) Stochastic Frontier (SF) 
Table 2. Definition of the variables, descriptive statistics and data sources 
 
Hypothesis*Variable Description Mean 
(S.D.)
Max
(Min) Cost Quality
Ownership variables      
Private-profitit Dummy variable which takes value 1 if the 
hospital is managed privately. 
0.43 
(0.49) 
1 
(0) 
- - 
Private-non-profitit Dummy variable which takes value 1 if the 
hospital is managed by a non-profit firm. 
0.16 
(0.36) 
1 
(0) 
- - 
Privately-fundedit Dummy variable which takes value 1 if the 
hospital finances more than a 10% of their 
patients with private funds. 
0.18 
(0.39) 
1 
(0) 
+ + 
Dependent variables      
Ln total unitary 
expenditureit 
Natural logarithm of total unitary 
expenditure  deflated into 2007 prices per 
discharged patients.  
7.86 
(1.47) 
13.43 
(4.12) 
 
-- 
 
 
-- 
Qualityit Quality Index which accounts for: hospital 
adaptability, scientific-technical quality and 
consumer satisfaction. 
2.57 
(1.52) 
6 
(0) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
Intermediate outputs      
Ln dischargedit Natural logarithm of the number of 
discharged patients in hospital i during the 
year t. 
7.55 
(1.93) 
11.12 
(0) 
- Not 
clear 
Ln Case-mixit Natural logarithm of the Case-mix index 
following Roemer (1968) 
2.46 
(2.02) 
9.08  
(-4.97) 
+ Not 
clear 
Ln Rotation Indexit Natural logarithm of the number of 
discharged patients per installed beds 
5.36 
(0.62) 
5.92  
(-0.20) 
Not 
clear 
Not 
clear 
Input variables      
Ln Installed bedsit Natural logarithm of the number of 
installed beds in each hospital i and time t. 
4.78 
(1.08) 
7.56 
(1.38) 
+ Not 
clear 
Ln Average Wageit Natural logarithm of total personal 
expenditure per number of employees 
deflated in 2007 prices. 
9.00 
(1.09) 
11.13 
(5.21) 
+ + 
Emergency roomit Dummy variable which takes value 1 if the 
hospital offers emergency room services. 
0.73 
(0.44) 
1 
(0) 
+ Not 
clear 
Ln investmentit Natural logarithm of total investment in 
fixed assets per installed bed deflated in 
2007 prices. 
7.13 
(1.94) 
12.78 
(-1.17) 
-- + 
Control Variables      
Surgicalit Dummy variable which takes value 1 if the 
observation is a surgical hospital 
0.07 
(0.25) 
1 
(0) 
-- -- 
Other acuteit Dummy variable which takes value 1 if the 
observation is  an other acute hospital 
0.07 
(0.26) 
1 
(0) 
-- -- 
Psychiatricit Dummy variable which takes value 1 if the 
observation is a psychiatric hospital 
0.10 
(0.31) 
1 
(0) 
-- -- 
Long stayit Dummy variable which takes value 1 if the 
observation is a long stay hospital 
0.14 
(0.35) 
1 
(0) 
-- -- 
Y07 Dummy variable which takes value 1 if the 
observation is from 2007 
  -- -- 
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Table 3. Variables included in the quality index 
Average 
(observations above) 
Adaptability 
Definition 
1997 2007 
-Nurses per installed bed Hospital’s nurse per bed ratio 0.45 
(327) 
0.71 
(347) 
-Physical equipment per 
installed bed  
Number of physical equipment which 
includes incubators, surgical rooms and 
birthing rooms per installed bed 
0.05 
(294) 
0.06 
(316) 
Scientific-Technical    
-Mortality rate Number of hospital deaths per admitted 
patients. 
0.09 
(637) 
0.08 
(627) 
-Technological equipment 
per installed bed 
Sum of technological equipment available 
in the hospital which includes X-ray rooms, 
X-ray computed tomography, Magnetic 
Resonance, renal litroticia equipment, 
Hemodynamic Rooms, Digital Angiography, 
Gamma Camera, Megavoltage x-Rays and 
Hemodialysis technology per installed beds. 
0.04 
(279) 
0.05 
(274) 
-Medical School for 
graduates 
Dummy variable which take value one if the 
hospital accepts Medical School graduate 
students. 
0.26 
(205) 
0.29 
(224) 
Consumer satisfaction degree 
-Health Care System 
evaluation 
Average opinion of the Spanish Health 
Care Sysrem per CA.  
6.78 
(269) 
6.99 
(177) 
*EESRI. Estadística de Establecimientos Sanitarios con Régimen de Internado. Ministry of Health 
and Social Affairs. 
**Barómetro Sanitario. Ministry of Health and Social Affairs. 
***INE. Instituto Nacional de estadística. Spanish Nacional Statistics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Institut de Recerca en Economia Aplicada Regional i Pública                                 Document de Treball 2010/12  pàg. 32
Research Institute of Applied Economics                                                                   Working Paper         2010/12 pag. 32


Table 4. Cost equation estimates  
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Baseline: Public and 
publicly funded hospitals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
All hospitals General hospitals 
Ln total unitary 
expenditure Ownership Publicly 
founded 
Ownership Publicly 
founded 
Private-profitit -0.302*** -0.278*** -0.364*** -0.278*** 
 (0.035) (0.045) (0.044) (0.055) 
Private-non-profitit -0.368*** -0.297*** -0.400*** -0.236*** 
 (0.039) (0.053) (0.052) (0.074) 
Privately-fundedit 0.080** -- 0.124*** -- 
 (0.037)  (0.047)  
Ln dischargedit -0.722*** -0.784*** -0.474*** -0.510*** 
 (0.018) (0.029) (0.037) (0.066) 
Ln Case-mixit 0.017** -0.002 0.015 0.008 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) 
Ln Rotation Indexit -0.018 -0.012 -0.190*** -0.311*** 
 (0.034) (0.082) (0.057) (0.116) 
Ln Installed bedsit 0.647*** 0.746*** 0.481*** 0.577*** 
 (0.022) (0.031) (0.037) (0.062) 
Ln Average Wageit 0.584*** 0.676*** 0.525*** 0.641*** 
 (0.034) (0.057) (0.042) (0.069) 
Emergency roomit 0.093** 0.136** 0.074 0.356 
 (0.043) (0.062) (0.081) (0.095) 
Ln Investment 0.087*** 0.057*** 0.063*** 0.034*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) 
Surgicalit -0.066 0.027 -- -- 
 (0.058) (0.132)   
Other acuteit -0.013 -0.042 -- -- 
 (0.055) (0.071)   
Psychiatricit -0.382*** -0.454*** -- -- 
 (0.066) (0.090)   
Long stayit -0.285*** -0.352*** -- -- 
 (0.057) (0.074)   
y07 0.857*** 0.787*** 0.989*** 0.874 
 (0.067) (0.100) (0.082) (0.123) 
constant 4.178*** 3.513*** 4.482*** 
 (0.279) (0.536) (0.327) 
3.830*** 
(0.690) 
Number of 
observations 
1275 690 789 454 
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.95 
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Table 5. Quality equation estimates  
Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.1. Baseline: Public and 
publicly funded hospitals.  
 
 
 
 All hospitals General hospitals 
Quality Ownership Publicly funded Ownership Publicly funded 
Private-profitit -1.729*** -1.789*** -2.369*** -2.506*** 
 (0.178) (0.276) (0.241) (0.410) 
Private-non-profitit -1.801*** -1.440*** -2.919*** -2.512*** 
 (0.213) (0.280) (0.303) (0.377) 
Privately-fundedit 0.095 -- 0.042 -- 
 (0.147)  (0.220)  
Ln dischargedit 0.875*** 0.971*** 1.928*** 2.629*** 
 (0.100) (0.162) (0.251) (0.482) 
Ln Case-mixit -0.034 -0.046 0.004 -0.0002 
 (0.036) (0.058) (0.046) (0.082) 
Ln Rotation Indexit -0.356** -0.293 -0.942*** -1.400*** 
 (0.138) (0.291) (0.259) (0.485) 
Ln Installed bedsit -0.881*** -0.708*** -1.704*** -2.023*** 
 (0.106) (0.164) (0.215) (0.158) 
Ln Average Wageit 0.089 0.589 -0.062 0.729 
 (0.140) (0.377) (0.178) (0.516) 
Emergency roomit 0.398** 0.643** 0.496 1.140 
 (0.183) (0.329) (0.345) (0.722) 
Ln Investment 0.133*** 0.141*** 0.126** 0.153** 
 (0.037) (0.067) (0.049) (0.077) 
Surgicalit -0.261 -0.173 -- -- 
 (0.188) (0.464)   
Other acuteit -0.538** -0.663** -- -- 
 (0.231) (0.331)   
Psychiatricit 0.309 0.709 -- -- 
 (0.364) (0.565)   
Long stayit -2.756*** -2.705*** -- -- 
 (0.352) (0.489)   
y07 -0.665** -1.528** -0.496 -1.979 
 (0.284) (0.691) (0.362) (0.948) 
Number of 
observations 
1275 1275 789 454 
Prob>2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.29 0.14 0.15 
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